Chris Coyne explains why there can be no compromise on end-to-end encryption:
This week, the Washington Post’s editorial board, in a widely circulated call for “compromise” on encryption, proposed that while our data should be off-limits to hackers and other bad actors, “perhaps Apple and Google could invent a kind of secure golden key” so that the good guys could get to it if necessary.
This theoretical “secure golden key” would protect privacy while allowing privileged access in cases of legal or state-security emergency. Kidnappers and terrorists are exposed, and the rest of us are safe. Sounds nice. But this proposal is nonsense, and, given the sensitivity of the issue, highly dangerous. Here’s why.
A great explanation of why it doesn’t make sense to give trusted entities the ability to intercept encrypted communications. Too bad the U.K. Prime Minister and his advisors didn’t read this prior to announcing new anti-terror policies.